Archive for the ‘monetary policy’ Category

The Bitcoin price bubble

April 4, 2013

The Bitcoin is a virtual currency. The currency was created on July 17, 2010 by an unknown computer scientist with the stock of ‘coins’ growing according to a predetermined algorithm. At its launch, one Bitcoin exchanged for $0.05 (a nickel).

Untethered to any real asset, the Bitcoin’s price is determined purely by speculation on exchanges around the world. In the absence of any government intervention, a buying frenzy has sent the value of the total Bitcoin stock past $1.5 billion. The price of a single Bitcoin has doubled in less than two weeks. Having passed $100 on April 1, 2013, it peaked (so far) at $147 a Bitcoin on April 3, 2013, before falling back to $110.

The Bitcoin currency may grow in accordance with a predetermined algorithm, but it is nothing if not volatile with respect to price. A 2011 spike took the price of a Bitcoin from $2 to over $30 – and back again. Now, in the wake of the Greek Cypriot bank bailout fiasco, Bitcoin’s advocates are pitching the currency as an alternative to authorized currencies that can be devalued or confiscated at the will of political hacks.

All bubbles eventually burst and the Bitcoin will prove to be no exception. A major problem is that governments prefer a monopoly of theft. They do not relish competition in that lucrative activity. So if the Bitcoin gets too big for government’s boots, they will stamp down on it.

Gold, coin and bullion, still remains the preferred asset for those who do not place great faith in government.But do take delivery and hide your holdings from inquisitive government eyes.

Roofs or ceilings?: two Nobel Prize winners offer a lesson to the Federal Reserve

January 29, 2013

In 1945, when millions of Americans returned home after service during World War II, the San Francisco housing market manifested a massive shortage of available housing. The reason for this apparent market dislocation, however, had nothing to do with a failure of market forces. It had everything to do with the socialization of the housing market. The City had imposed a tight ceiling on the rents that could be charged by those who owned the housing stock.

In a 1946 essay, with the catchy title of “Roofs or Ceilings”, two future Nobel Prize winning economists, Milton Friedman and George Stigler exposed the true nature of the problem. If a city desires to secure more roofs over the heads of returning veterans, the best route to do so is to remove the ceiling on rentals. Eventually, San Francisco government saw the light, and the housing shortage immediately disappeared.

Since the 2008 financial crisis, the Federal Reserve has blindly followed the immediate postwar example of the City of San Francisco. It has essentially socialized the market for bank loans by imposing a ceiling on the interest rates that banks can effectively charge when making business loans. As a direct consequence, borrowers desire more loans than in a true market (because interest is too low) and lenders supply fewer loans than in a true market (because interest is too low). The short end of the market always rules. So too few loans are consummated. The economically uneducated (Paul Krugman is a prime example) then rant that the economy is in a liquidity trap.

In reality, the Federal Reserve has chosen ceilings over roofs, thereby imposing severe harm on the economy.It has done so by maintaining a near-zero federal funds rate while ratcheting up its purchases of mortgage-backed and U.S. Treasury securities in order to hold short and long-term rates well below market levels. Effectively the Fed is imposing an interest-rate ceiling on the longer-term market by saying it will keep the short rate unusually low.

There is little economic incentive for lenders to extend credit, especially to risky borrowers, at that rate. The decline in credit availability reduces aggregate demand, which tends to increase the rate of unemployment. This is a classic unintended consequence of such a policy. The policy is a classic form of behavior on the part of Keynesian economists such as Paul Krugman and Ben Bernanke.

Hat Tip: John B. Taylor, ‘Fed Policy is a Drag on the Economy’, The Wall Street Journal, January 29, 2013

Jeffrey Sachs is born again: rejects Keynes and embraces Hayek

December 18, 2012

In a remarkable column published in today’s Financial Times, Jeffrey Sachs exhibits a fundamental reversal of his economic thinking. Until now, one of the foremost disciples of John Maynard Keynes, he  openly and categorically rejects that doctrine. As one of the foremost skeptics of Austrian economics, he now openly embraces the economic thought of Friedrich von Hayek.  I choked on my morning orange juice as I took in the magnitude of this rebirth.

1. Sachs on Keynes

“The rebound of Keynesianism, led in the US by Lawrence Summers…Paul Krugman…and… Ben Bernanke…came with the belief that short-term fiscal and monetary expansion was needed to offset the collapse of the housing market…The US policy choice has been fours years of structural (cyclically adjusted) budget deficits of general government of 7 per cent of gross domestic product or more; interest rates near zero; another call by the White House for stimulus in 2013; and the Fed’s new policy to keep rates near zero until unemployment returns to 6.6 per cent…We can’t know how successful (or otherwise) these policies have been because of the lack of convincing counterfactuals.  But we should have serious doubts.   The promised jobs recovery has not arrived.  Growth has remained sluggish. The US debt-GDP ratio has almost doubled, from about 36 per cent in 2007 to 72 per cent this year. Jeffrey Sachs, ‘We must look beyond Keynes to fix our problems’, Financial Times, December 19, 2012

2. Sachs on Hayek

“the zero interest rate policy has a risk not acknowledged by the Fed: the creation of another bubble.  The Fed failed to appreciate that the 2008 bubble was partly caused by its own easy liquidity policies in the preceding six years.  Friedrich Hayek was prescient:  a surge of excessive liquidity can misdirect investments that lead to boom followed by bust.” Jeffrey Sachs, ‘We must look beyond Keynes to fix our problems’, Financial Times, December 19, 2012

I have no doubt that many readers of this column will also choke on their beverage of choice as they read these born again words of revelation from this former sinner:

Amazing grace, how sweet the sound

That saved a wretch like me.

I once was lost, but now am found.

Was blind, but now, I see.”

 

Federal Reserve signals inflation-spiral

December 15, 2012

At his press conference this week, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke committed the Federal Reserve to near-zero interest rates until the US unemployment rate falls below 6.5 per cent. Currently, the unemployment rate stands at 7.7 per cent.

Given the massive expansion of federal spending under President Obama, and given the elimination of many unskilled jobs as a result of technical change and out-sourcing, the natural rate of unemployment in the United States may now be as high as 7 per cent. If this is correct, the Federal Reserve will pay for a 6.6 per cent unemployment rate with inflation rates that increase over time more or less rapidly depending on whether rational  or adaptive expectations determine responses to such monetary expansion.

In any event, Bernanke has announced a revolution in US monetary policy. Henceforth monetary policy will not seek to hold inflation to a maximum of two per cent per annum.  It will allow inflation to rise to whatever rate is necessary to lower unemployment to 6.6 per cent in response to near-zero interest rates.

Some apologists will laud this as a move to a nominal GDP target. But they are Obama-sycophant serpents speaking  with forked tongues.

The real objective of such a shift in Fed policy is socialism.

“The best way to destroy the capitalist system is to debauch the currency.” V.I. Lenin

Bernanke should read Silber’s biography of Volcker

September 30, 2012

Richard L. Silber has written a detailed new biography of Paul Volcker, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve who successfully eliminated the stagflation of the late 1970′s in the United States.  Appropriately, his biography is entitled, Volcker: The Triumph of Persistence.

In response to questions posed by Neil Irwin of The Washington Post (September 30, 2012),  Silber draws important insights for current Fed policy from his in-depth analysis of Paul Volcker’s lasting contribution to price stability in the United States.

“Bernanke gets an A for what he did in 2008.  He did exactly what a central banker, knowing the history of the Great Depression, should have done when confronted with the potential for panic. Open up the floodgates and lend.  But now he should worry about the fallout from remaining too easy for too long, which Volcker maintains is the reason we lost the battle against inflation before.” Neil Irwin, ‘Volcker biographer: Bernanke needs to embrace lessons of  ’70s’, The Washington Post, September 30, 2012

In his response to Irwin’s questions, Silber identifies two major lessons that must be learned from the 1970s:

“The 1970s delivered two important messages.  First, we can’t get a permanent reduction in unemployment by inflating. It doesn’t work.  And second, we’ve got to worry about inflation, even with unemployed resources. Waiting until we see a clear and present danger is too late.” ibid.

Why is inflation such a serious problem?

“He (Volcker) believes that the main problem with inflation is that it undermines trust in government.  We, as citizens, give the government the right to print money, not to abuse that right by inflating. When the government inflates, it breaks its pledge and undermines our trust.  Right now, we need trust in government more than anything else.” ibid.

Is inflation currently a realistic impending problem?

“The big difference today versus the problem Volcker confronted in 1979 is that inflationary expectations were already out of hand back then.  Today, they are still under control, but no one knows how fragile they are.  More importantly, it will be difficult for Ben Bernanke, or whoever follows him, to maintain low expectations of inflation by raising real interest rates – the way Volcker did – when that’s needed.  We have had five years of unemployment, and the American public may not tolerate a central bank that acts preemptively, as it must, to prevent inflation.  The Fed is independent, but it cannot do whatever it wants.” ibid.

I offer these words of distilled wisdom for your consideration.  Unusually, they arrive as a useful warning before, and not after, the impending crisis has  emerged.  As such they are to be treasured.

Fed easy money punishes middle class Americans

September 27, 2012

John Maynard Keynes first noted that labor market equilibrium may be impacted by price inflation.  He noted workers’ strong preference for a 2 per cent wage increase in a 4 per cent inflation environment over a 2 per cent decrease in nominal wages during a period of constant prices. For many years politicians attempted to exploit this illusion by hiking up inflation rates.  Ultimately, the entire process collapsed in 1970′s stagflation, as the Phillips curve became upward sloping in price inflation/rate of unemployment space.

Money illusion has not disappeared, however, from the box of tools of the Federal Reserve. Indeed it is alive and well in the easy money policies emanating from the Fed since September 2008. Indeed, the Fed, under the chairmanship of Ben Bernanke, has becoming increasingly bold in exploiting money illusion. With inflationary expectations not yet rattled by the Fed’s $2 trillion balance-sheet expansion, Bernanke has now committed the Fed to an open-ended round of quantitative easing in the expectation of trading a little extra inflation for a little short-term employment.

These actions hurt the middle class – the group for which the policy is designed – as low interest rates sap their investment returns and as creeping inflation erodes their perceived real living standards.

“The more than five-fold increase in the median income of the American household since 1971, to $50,000 from $9,000, certainly provides the clear appearance of progress.  But after the dollar’s 82% loss of purchasing power over the same period is factored in, the median household income rose just 12%.  This much more modest increase is largely the result of the growing prevalence of two-income households.  The median real income for working men over the same 40-year period rose just 8%.  And thaat improvement only accrued to the ever-shrinking percentage of men fortunate enough to still have full-time jobs – just 67% according to the latest data from the Bureau of labor Statistics, within a percentage point of the lowest level on record since the figure was first recorded in 1948.”  Sean Fieler,  ’Easy Money Is Punishing the Middle Class’, The Wall Street Journal,  September 27, 2012

As price inflation creeps upwards, from 2 per cent per annum to 4 per cent per annum, the price signals necessary for American workers to compete in the global market-place are dulled and incentives to re-educate and re-adjust are dimmed.  The end result is serious structural unemployment of the kind that now seriously hinders economic recovery in the United States. Ben Bernanke is the worst enemy that working Americans could ever wish to avoid. For he is working on their perceived cognitive deficiencies to gain short-term advantage for his Wall Street friends and cronies.

 

Here they go again: and here comes stagflation!

July 25, 2012

This leaves a second option: the Fed could couple more quantitative easing with a formal announcement of a higher inflation target. Some Fed leaders are open to this. Charles Evans, the Chicago Fed president, has floated the idea of a 3 per cent target, effective until unemployment falls below 7 per cent.  A higher inflation target would lead markets to understand the Fed is committed to quantitative easing of game-changing magnitude, inducing the behavioral shifts needed to make the policy succeed.  Financiers would embrace risk assets rather than safe ones with real returns that would be clearly negative.  Companies expecting more growth , would step up investments.  Consumers, seeing the real value of their debts eroding, would probably spend more.” Sebastian Mallaby, ‘Show some real audacity at the Fed’, Financial Times, July 25, 2012

Mallaby is not alone in this crazy desire to return to the stagflation of the 1970s.  Tyler Cowen and Scott Sumner among many other so-called free market thinkers take the same line.  They have short memories. Once politicians began to exploit the fictitional Phillips Curve, trading off  higher inflation against lower unemployment, the statistiical trade off disappeared. Phillips himself was not at all surprised. He was my tutor at the LSE and advised me of the foolishness of trying to exploit such a purely statistical relationship. Of course,  A.W. Phillips was absolutely correct.

Nations witnessed rising rates of unemployment coupled to rising rates of price inflation and associated with economic stagnation. Politicians abandoned Keynesianism in droves, aware that its continued application would drive them out of the political market-place. Until September 2008, the vast majority of economists were stamping on Keynes’s grave.

The real motive behind inflationist rhetoric is to steal wealth from creditors and transfer it to debtors. Not only is such a policy one version of socialism – that is why true free market economists would never advocate it – but it is also full of moral hazard.

Always a borrower and never a lender be!  A wonderful prescription for economic success!

The Federal Reserve has lost touch with basic economics

July 10, 2012

The United States economy is recovering far more slowly from the 2008 financial crisis than from any previous recession since the end of World War II. The rate of economic growth is way below trend and the rate of unemployment, properly defined, is way above its natural level and shows no sign of any decline.

The forces behind this slow recovery most assuredly include neither a shortage of base money nor excessively high rates of interest.

U.S. banks have $1.5 trillion in cash on their balances sheets in excess of their legally required reserves. That is far more than enough to meet any unsatisfied demand for loans considered by bankers to satisfy the conditions of prudence. In the summer of 2010, the Federal Reserve added $600 billion to banks’ reserves by purchasing federal Treasurys and mortgage-backed securities. In June 2012, $500 billion of those reserves remain on U.S. bank balance sheets, while most of the rest lie in the vaults of foreign banks.

Meanwhile, market interest rates on all maturities of government bonds are the lowest since the founding of the republic.  With mortgage rates lower than ever in history, and housing showing at best very sluggish recovery, dropping the mortgage rate another fraction is useless.  Business investment also is unlikely to be augmented by some fractional reduction in borrowing costs.

The 800 pound gorillas in the nation’s market place are fiscal not monetary in nature. Businesses simply will not invest in a climate of uncertainty wherein they will have no idea of next year’s tax rates, health care costs and regulatory burdens until after November 6, 2012.  Many businesses, in any event,  are exercising a capital strike until the current administration is out of office.  Consumers will not increase their expenditures while uncertainties remain about their tax burdens and health care responsibilities.  The economy as a whole shudders under the realization that  elected officials ignore a major public debt crisis and allow the debt to increase unabated at the rate of $4 billion per day.

None of these problems are amenable to monetary policy, be it through interest rate cuts – virtually impossible – or through quantitative easing. Surely even a  blinkered Harvard economist such as Ben Bernanke can dimly understand this line of economic reasoning.

What can be impacted by such inappropriate monetary expansion, however, is the rate of price inflation across the nation. Markets already perceive the danger. Why else would investors such as myself pay heavy premia in order to hold index-linked Treasury bonds that protect against inflation?  Why else would asset holders shift the balance of their portfolios away from money in favor of equities and real assets?

By failing to understand basic economics, Ben Bernanke leads the Federal Reserve into a monetary policy that cannot conceivably save the neck of the incumbent president – which surely must be his implicit goal –  but which assuredly will reintroduce, with long and variable lags, the 1970s nightmare of stagflation across the United States.

Hat Tip: Allan Meltzer, ‘What’s Wrong With the Federal Reserve’, The Wall Street Journal, July 10, 2012

Eagles are worth more than owls in euroland

May 23, 2012

Gresham’s Law – bad money drives out good – dates from an era of metallic currency. Debased coins circulated while genuine coins were hoarded.  Gresham’s Law now applies to a single currency – the euro – where some euros are deemed to be more valuable than others.

“When countries joined the single currency, a relatively simple piece of legislation converted contracts into euros at a prescribed exchange rate.  But you cannot simply reverse that process when countries leave the single currency.  You have to prescribe which contracts are now to be fulfilled in drachmas and which remain in euros, or converted into Deutschmarks.  That determination is politically fraught, technically complex and subject to long legal challenges.” John Kay, ‘All euros are equal but some are more equal than others’, Financial Times, May 23, 2012

The issue is not whether the euro coins in one’s pocket carry an Athenian owl or a German eagle.  The issue goes to bank deposits and loans, residential mortgages and commercial contracts, as well as to wages and prices.  The drain of funds from Greek banks is an indication that ordinary people are now thinking in these terms. Instinctively, they understand the nature of Gresham’s Law.

Awaredness of Gresham’a Law is why a Greek exit from the eurozone presents an existential threat to the zone itself.  Once a path to exit has been defined, households and businessness will have a template for understanding the consequences of any further unwinding: cheap money always drives out dear money, if they exchange for the same price.

In the current eurozone context, German and Finnish euros are worth more than Greek, Spanish, Irish, Portuguese and Italian euros. For the former carry only upside risk whereas the latter carry only the risk of loss. Once the Greek template clarifies the magnitude of this differential, Gresham’s Law will follow with a vengeance:

Since there is potentially no limit to the willingness of the private sector to exchange weak euros for strong, the only limit to the process is the patience of German and Finnish taxpayers. So check whether the euros you hold are eagles or owls before others do.” John Kay, ibid.

Banking is true Achilles heel for the eurozone

May 19, 2012

By now it is common knowledge that a full currency union without a corresponding fiscal union is unworkable unless the currency union is optimal. The eurozone is not even remotely an optimal currency union – its north- south divide is a splitting chasm – and divergent fiscal policies have brought the zone to the edge of complete collapse.

It is now becoming apparent, however, that the state of the eurozone’s banking system poses a much more mortal threat to the single currency than the state of its fiscal finances. Arguably, banking is the true Achilles heel for the eurozone. An on-target joke about Greece, for example, is that the euro will be out of Greece before Greece is out of the eurozone.

Across Greece, since last week’s failure to form a pro-austerity pact government, deposit withdrawals by Greek nationals from Greek banks has accelerated dramatically.  Unless this is checked, Greece will run out of euros well before mid-June, and a replacement drachma currency will become inevitable.

The eurozone’s original sin was to unify money into a common currency while leaving the responsibility for banking firmly under sovereign control. Despite financial integration many banks, especially among the PIIGS, are over-extended in their domestic markets and over-committed to their sovereign debt.

This combination of common money and national banking is a primary cause of the sector’s continuing chronic under-capitalization. National regulators, cognizant of the ease of capital flight within the eurozone, hesitate to compel banks to write down their losses from the credit crisis. In consequence, many banks cannot attract private capital. National governments have filled the gaps with taxpayer injections to the point where they have stretched the credibility of their sovereign credit-worthiness.

Should the specter of a credit-run emerge – as is surely on the cards for Greece, and most likely also for Spain – any eurozone solution would have to be euro-wide. The European Central Bank  can stop any run it wants – but only to solvent but illiquid banks and against sufficient collateral.  The lender of last resort cannot, however, bear the solvency risk of banks.  Nor, at this stage in the eurozone crisis, can all governments.

So, if the eurozone is to survive, not only is fiscal harmonization important. More crucial still is the option of recapitalizing eurozone banks with eurozone funds.  Such an authority is inconceivable without eurozone authority to write down creditors and restructure banks. In essence, euro members may soon find that banking union is more important than fiscal union.

And so, some two-thirds of a century on, Adolf  Hitler’s vision of a Third Reich that would last 1,000 years may be back on the  playing field of continental Europe. Thankfully, the United Kingdom remains safely offshore.


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